The stability of the labor share of income is a key foundation in macroeconomic models. We document, however, that the global labor share has significantly declined since the early 1980s, with the decline occurring within the large majority of countries and industries. We show that the decrease in the relative price of investment goods, often attributed to advances in information technology and the computer age, induced firms to shift away from labor and toward capital. The lower price of investment goods explains roughly half of the observed decline in the labor share, even when we allow for other mechanisms influencing factor shares, such as increasing profits, capital-augmenting technology growth, and the changing skill composition of the labor force. We highlight the implications of this explanation for welfare and macroeconomic dynamics. JEL Codes: E21, E22, E25.
I. Introduction
At least since the work of Kaldor (1957) , the stability of the labor share of income has been a fundamental feature of macroeconomic models, with broad implications for the shape of the production function, inequality, and macroeconomic dynamics. We document that the global labor share has declined significantly since the early 1980s, with the decline occurring within the large majority of countries and industries. We demonstrate how the decline of the labor share can be explained by the decline in the relative price of investment goods. Efficiency gains in capital-producing sectors, often attributed to advances in information technology and the computer age, induced firms to shift away from labor and toward capital to such a large extent that the labor share of income declined.
We start by documenting a 5 percentage point decline in the share of global corporate gross value added paid to labor over the past 35 years. We measure the labor share using a novel data set we compile by combining country-specific data posted on the Internet with sector-level national income accounting data from multilateral organizations obtained digitally and collected from physical books. Our baseline analyses focus on the labor share within the corporate sector because this allows us to circumvent important measurement difficulties confronted by most of the labor share literature. As emphasized by Gollin (2002) , aggregate labor share measures are influenced by the methods used to separate the labor and capital income earned by entrepreneurs, sole proprietors, and unincorporated businesses. The corporate labor share is not subject to such imputations. Although previous analyses of U.S. data have sometimes focused on the corporate labor share, we are unaware of other research focusing on corporate labor shares in such a large sample of countries.
Of the 59 countries with at least 15 years of data between 1975 and 2012, 42 exhibited downward trends in their labor shares. Of the trend estimates that are statistically significant, 37 are negative and only 9 are positive. We complement our analysis with industry-level data and show that 6 of the 10 major industries experienced significant labor share declines and only 2 experienced the opposite. Most of the global decline in the labor share is attributable to within-industry changes rather than to changes in industrial composition. 1 The pervasiveness of the decline in the labor share is even present in regional data for the United States, where two-thirds of the states experienced declines over this period.
The decline in the price of investment relative to consumption goods accelerated starting in the early 1980s. We develop a model that relates the decline in the labor share to this coincident decline in the relative price of investment goods. The economy produces two final goods (consumption and investment) using a continuum of intermediate inputs. Technology differences in the production of final goods cause shifts in the price of investment relative to the price of consumption goods and affect the rate at which households rent capital to the firms. Monopolistically competitive firms produce intermediate inputs with capital and labor using a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) technology and sell their output each period at a constant markup over marginal cost. Changes in the rental rate of capital induce producers to change their capital-labor ratios and, for nonunitary elasticities of substitution, the shares of each factor in production costs. Changes in price markups additionally change the shares of each factor in income.
In our model the labor share will only change in response to shocks that influence the rental rate of capital, markups, or capital-augmenting technology, with the magnitude of any response being a function of the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor and the levels of the labor share and markups. Given our focus on long-term trends, we treat the data as being generated from the model's transition from one steady state to another. Assuming a constant household discount factor and depreciation rate of capital, changes across steady states in the rental rate only reflect changes in the relative price of investment. Heterogeneity across countries in the level or growth of any variable other than the relative price of investment, markups, or capital-augmenting technology will therefore not matter for long-term trends in the labor share. This logic argues against the possibility that shocks to other macroeconomic objects such as labor income taxes or household labor supply are important for explaining the labor share decline.
To determine the implications of the declining relative price of investment for the labor share, we use our model to estimate the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor. Most prior estimates use time series variation within a country in factor shares and factor prices to identify the elasticity. By contrast, our estimates are identified from cross-country variation in trends in rental rates and labor shares. Therefore, our estimates are not influenced by the global component of the labor share decline, the object that we intend to explain. Put differently, even if each individual country experienced a decline in both its relative price of investment and its labor share, there is nothing in our methodology that prevents us from associating a global decline in the price of investment with a global increase in the labor share.
The rental rate of capital can be influenced at high frequency by various factors such as short-run changes in interest rates, adjustment costs, or financial frictions. These factors, however, are unlikely to have a significant influence on long-run trends in the rental rate, particularly compared to the relative price of investment goods, which moves proportionately with the rental rate across steady states of our model. Therefore, our estimates focus on low-frequency variation and only include countries with at least 15, and as many as 37, years of data. Rather than having to use more volatile proxies of the rental rate, this allows us to exploit high-quality and widely available data on the relative price of investment.
We start by assuming that capital-augmenting technology growth is orthogonal to the price of investment shock and that the economy has zero profits. In the data, countries and industries experiencing larger declines in the relative price of investment also experienced larger labor share declines. This leads to our preferred estimate of the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor of about 1.25. When confronted with the 25% decline in the global relative price of investment that occurred since 1975, our model delivers roughly half of the 5 percentage point decline in the global labor share.
Next, we allow for the possibility that markups affect our estimated elasticity. Imagine that markups increased more in countries with larger declines in the relative price of investment. Even in the Cobb-Douglas case, which features a constant labor share of costs, this would produce a spurious association between declining labor shares of income and declining prices of investment. Our baseline procedure would incorrectly estimate an elasticity greater than 1. To address this concern, we use long-term trends in nominal investment rates to approximate changes in the capital-output ratio and follow Rotemberg and Woodford (1995) in using this ratio to calculate capital shares and markups. We find that markups generally increased and therefore did play a role in the labor share decline. However, when we modify our empirical framework to take markups into account, the estimated elasticity, and thus the implied contribution of the price of investment to the labor share decline, is essentially unchanged relative to our benchmark results.
Similarly, our elasticity estimate might be biased upward if capital-augmenting technology growth is greater in countries with larger declines in the relative price of investment. 2 The size of the bias is a function of the covariance between capitalaugmenting technology growth and changes in the relative price of investment in the cross-section of countries. We show that if the pattern of capital-augmenting technology growth is similar to the pattern of estimated total factor productivity (TFP) growth, then our estimated elasticity is biased upward by less than 0.05. Alternatively, we calculate capital-augmenting technology growth for each country assuming that it accounts for all labor share changes not attributable to changes in the relative price of investment. We find that the implied changes in capitalaugmenting technology are uncorrelated with changes in the relative price of investment in the cross section of countries. Therefore, allowing for capital-augmenting technology growth does not alter our assessment of the importance of decline in the relative price of investment for the decline in the labor share.
We also consider the possibility that changes in the skill composition of the labor force affect our estimates and explanation. We modify the production function to allow for two types of labor that are differentially substitutable with capital. We use this framework to estimate the sensitivity of the labor share with respect to the relative price of investment goods, controlling for changes in the stock of skill relative to the stock of capital. Our results show that the declining price of investment goods continues to account for roughly half of the decline in the labor share.
We conclude by using our model to evaluate the implications of our explanation for the decline in the labor share. Our framework abstracts from inequality across households and is only suitable for quantifying the implications of the labor share decline for a representative household. We start by comparing the effect of the observed shock to the relative price of investment in a standard model with Cobb-Douglas production relative to our model with CES production and an elasticity of substitution equal to 1.25. Welfare gains resulting from the shock are nearly a quarter (or 4 percentage points) higher in the CES case. Next, we compare the consequences of two shocks-a decline in the relative price of investment and an increase in markups-each of which generates an equal reduction in the labor share. The differences are stark. A labor share decline due to reductions in the relative price of investment is associated with large welfare gains. The same labor share decline, but due to increases in markups, is associated with modest welfare losses.
Our work relates to several strands of literature. First, our findings are consistent with earlier work by Blanchard (1997) , Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) , Jones (2003) , and Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003) that focuses on the variability of labor shares over the medium run, including the large declines seen during the 1980s in Western Europe. 3 Harrison (2002) and Rodriguez and Jayadev (2010) use UN data and are the broadest studies of trends in labor shares. Harrison (2002) finds a decreasing trend in the labor share of poor countries but an increasing trend in rich countries for 1960-1997. Rodriguez and Jayadev (2010) estimate a declining average trend in labor shares using an equally weighted set of 129 countries.
Our results improve and expand on this related literature. We capture significant movements in the labor share subsequent to 2000, include important non-Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries such as China, and use exchange rates to aggregate across countries and examine the global labor share. By focusing on the labor share in the corporate sector, rather than the overall labor share, our results are less subject to measurement problems caused by the imputation of labor earnings in unincorporated enterprises and by shifts in economic activity across sectors. Importantly, we offer novel evidence tying the decline in the labor share to the decline in the relative price of investment goods and compare our mechanism to other potential explanations.
Our work relates the decline in the labor share to the decline in the relative price of investment by estimating an elasticity of substitution between capital and labor that exceeds unity. 4 As reviewed in Antras (2004) and Chirinko (2008) , among others, there is a large literature estimating this elasticity. Though the 3. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) argue that deregulation in product and labor markets decreased labor shares and increased unemployment in Europe in the 1980s. Azmat, Manning, and Van Reenen (2012) explore deregulations in the network industry to further advance this argument.
4. As discussed in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and Jones (2003) , a balanced growth path with nonzero factor shares will only emerge if technology growth is labor-augmenting, regardless of the production function, or if the production function is Cobb-Douglas, even if technology growth is capital-augmenting. Acemoglu (2003) and Jones (2005) develop models in which firms choose technical progress to be labor-augmenting along the balanced growth path. If real wage growth or increases in the capital-labor ratio are caused by labor-augmenting technology growth, there need not be movement in the labor share.
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range of estimates is very wide, most estimates are below 1. 5 As already discussed, an important difference between our approach and that taken by most papers in the literature is that we estimate the elasticity from cross-sectional variation using many countries and industries and by focusing only on long-run trends, we take advantage of cross-sectional variation in the relative price of investment.
Finally, our article also relates to the literature on investment-specific technical change. Following Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman (1988) , and consistent with Hsieh and Klenow (2007) , we interpret innovations in the relative price of investment as reflecting investment-specific technology shocks. Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997) study the relevance of this type of shock for growth in the United States. Fisher (2006) documents an acceleration in the decline in the relative price of investment since 1982 and evaluates the importance of investment shocks for business cycles. Perhaps closest in spirit to our narrative, Krusell et al. (2000) study the evolution of the U.S. skill premium in a model with price of investment shocks and CES production between skilled labor and capital equipment.
II. Trends in Labor Shares and Investment Prices
We start by documenting the pervasive decline in labor shares around the world at the country, U.S. state, and industry levels. Next we document a decline in the relative price of investment goods, which we later show to be the key factor explaining the global trend in the labor share. Each subsection first describes the data sources used and then summarizes the relevant trends.
II.A. Declining Labor Shares
Our baseline results come from analysis of a new data set we construct using country-level statistics on labor share in the corporate sector. We generate these data by combining five broad 5. A notable exception is Duffy and Papageorgiou (2000) . Leon-Ledesma, McAdam, and Willman (2010) attribute some of the large variation in the estimates of the elasticity to the use of a single equation first-order condition rather than a joint estimation with the production function. Data limitations prevent us from employing their methodology. We note that they find a large downward bias in estimated elasticities from simulated time series when the true underlying elasticity is greater than 1.
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sources: (i) country-specific web pages (such as that managed by the Bureau of Economic Analysis [BEA] for the United States); (ii) digital files obtained from the United Nations (UN); (iii) digital files obtained from the OECD; (iv) physical books published by the UN; and (v) physical books published by the OECD. Over time and across countries there are some differences in methodologies, but our data generally conform to System of National Accounts (SNA) standards. 6 Economic activity is divided in the SNA into the corporate (C), household (H), and government (G) sectors. The household sector includes unincorporated businesses, sole proprietors, nonprofits serving households, and the actual and imputed rental income accruing to noncorporate owners of housing. The corporate sector includes financial and nonfinancial corporations. Nominal gross domestic product (GDP) Y equals the sum of sectoral gross value added Q (final output less intermediate consumption) and taxes net of subsidies on products: 7
The aggregate labor share equals total compensation of labor across all three sectors divided by GDP, or WN Y , where W equals the average wage and N equals hours worked. Corporate gross value added Q C equals the sum of compensation paid to labor W C N C , taxes net of subsidies on production (including items 6. The resulting data set with corporate and overall labor shares is available on the authors' web pages. To merge the data, we begin by using any values we are able to obtain from the Internet. This is our preferred source because it is the most likely to include data revisions. We then rank the digital files by the number of available years of data for each country and use these sources (in order) when the preferred sources lack data. Last, we similarly rank and use the printed sources. We only connect series together from multiple sources if they satisfy a ''smooth pasting'' condition whereby measures for any given variable from overlapping years for both sources are sufficiently close to each other. Though there are some exceptions, this procedure typically implies that one or two sources contribute the bulk of the data for any given country. These key sources do, however, differ across countries. We refer the reader to the SNA Section of the United Nations Statistics Division and to Lequiller and Blades (2006) for the most detailed descriptions of how national accounts are constructed and harmonized to meet SNA standards.
7. This is true for a large majority of countries but there are several exceptions. For example, BEA accounts for the United States include net taxes on products in the gross value added of each of the three sectors and also include unincorporated enterprises in what they call the business sector (rather than in the household sector). National accounts for Germany and China also include net taxes in sectoral gross value added.
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
such as corporate income and property taxes), and gross operating surplus (including items such as interests on loans, retained earnings, and dividend payments).
For most of our analyses, we focus on the labor share in the corporate sector, W C N C Q C . 8 The labor share measured within the corporate sector is not affected by the statistical imputation of wages from the combined capital and labor income earned by sole proprietors and unincorporated enterprises, highlighted by Gollin (2002) as problematic for the consistent measurement of the labor share. Additionally, we find the focus on the corporate labor share theoretically appealing given difficulties in specifying a production function and optimization problem for the government. We note that the corporate sector accounts for roughly 60% of the economy's total gross value added both in the U.S. and globally. Furthermore, we find that this share has been relatively stable throughout our sample period.
For all our analyses, we start in 1975 and only include countries that have at least 15 years of data. The resulting data set contains corporate sector-level information on the income structure of 59 countries for various years between 1975 and 2012. This is a significant increase in coverage relative to what is readily downloadable from the UN and OECD, but we also report similar results when only using those standard data sources.
The solid line in Figure I shows the evolution of the global corporate labor share in our data by plotting the year fixed effects from a least-squares regression of the corporate labor share on country and year fixed effects. The regression includes country fixed effects to eliminate the influence of countries entering and exiting the data set. We weight observations by corporate gross value added measured in U.S. dollars at market exchange rates. We normalize the fixed effects such that they equal the level of the corporate labor share in our data set in 1975. From a level of roughly 64%, the global corporate labor share has exhibited a relatively steady downward trend, reaching about 59% at the end of the sample. The dashed line plots the fixed effects from 8. According to the SNA, compensation of employees includes wages and salaries in cash, wages and salaries in kind, and employers' social contributions for sickness, accidents, and retirement (to social security funds and insurance enterprises). Though the treatment of gains associated with the exercise of stock options is subject to data availability and is not uniform across countries, most developed countries try to account for the value of stock options granted to employees as part of labor compensation (Lequiller 2002) .
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an equivalent regression and shows that labor's share of the overall economy also declined globally. 9 Unless otherwise noted, we refer to measures taken from the corporate sector when referring to the labor share. Figure II shows that the decline in the labor share occurred in each of the four largest economies in the world. The dashed Corporate Sector Overall
FIGURE I
Declining Global Labor Share
The figure shows year fixed effects from a regression of corporate and overall labor shares that also include country fixed effects to account for entry and exit during the sample. The regressions are weighted by corporate gross value added and GDP measured in U.S. dollars at market exchange rates. We normalize the fixed effects to equal the level of the global labor share in our dataset in 1975. 9. For transparency and cross-country consistency, we define the overall labor share here as compensation of employees divided by GDP and therefore exclude any labor income of unincorporated business and sole proprietors. The level of overall labor share is about 10 percentage points lower than the corporate labor share in part due to this exclusion as well as the inclusion of taxes in the denominator. There are a number of countries that lack the data required to calculate the corporate labor share but have data on the overall labor share. In such cases, we use the aggregate figures but scale them up by the average global ratio of corporate to overall labor share found in the data set and include these scaled values as part of our primary corporate-sector data set. The figure shows the labor share and its linear trend for the four largest economies in the world from 1975.
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lines plot linear trends estimated using all available data since 1975. All four trends are downward sloping and statistically significant at the 1% level. In fact, most countries in the world experienced this decline. Figure III shows linear trends for all 59 countries with data available for at least 15 years. The coefficients are scaled such that the units represent the percentage point change in the labor share every 10 years. Forty-two countries experienced labor share declines, compared to 17 that experienced increases. Of those 46 countries where the trends were statistically significant at the 5% level, the labor share declined in 37 of them. The largest eight economies are shaded, and with the United Kingdom as the only exception, they all experienced statistically significant declines.
The decline in the global labor share reflects declines in the large majority of countries around the world and is not simply a reflection of trends in a few big countries. In fact, even looking at regional data within the United States, we find that the decline is similarly broad-based. We calculate the labor share for all U.S. states plus the District of Columbia by dividing total compensation by value added in the BEA's state-level GDP data (these data do not isolate the corporate sector). 10 In parallel to the country trends plotted in Figure III , Figure IV shows labor share declines in the majority of U.S. states with 34 states experiencing labor share declines compared to 17 that experienced increases. Of those 38 states where the trends were statistically significant at the 5% level, the labor share declined in 27 of them.
Returning to the global analysis, we now ask how much of the global labor share decline reflects declines within industries and how much reflects changes in industrial composition. For example, the labor share in manufacturing is typically higher than in finance and business services. Does the decline in the labor share simply reflect the fact that manufacturing's share of economic activity has fallen while the share of economic activity in services has risen?
To answer this question, we use the EU KLEMS data set. It is available for far fewer countries and does not allow for a focus on 10. The data are available prior to and including 1997 using the SIC classification system and from 1997 onward using the NAICS classification system. We match the 1997 values at the most disaggregated level and scale the SIC values by the discrepancy. This effectively shifts the earlier values of overall U.S. labor share up by about 1 percentage point and results in a continuous series which we then use.
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the corporate sector, but it allows us to construct labor shares for each country in commonly defined industries of varying granularity. 11 Figure V plots labor share trends, scaled to equal the percentage point change per decade, for 10 nonoverlapping industries that aggregate to the overall economy. For each industry we estimate a linear trend from a regression of the labor share that includes country fixed effects and weights countries by their value added in that industry. The labor share significantly declines in six of the eight industries with statistically significant trends. The remaining two exhibit statistically insignificant declines in their labor shares. 11. These data end in 2007, several years earlier than our baseline data set. When we overlap the KLEMS data with our data set, we find that the country labor share trends are quite similar for the years in which both sources exist. The correlation of country trends is over 90% if one excludes the two large outliers of Luxembourg and Ireland.
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Finally, we more formally address the question of how much of the change in the labor share is due to changing sizes of industries with different levels of labor shares and how much is due to changes in labor shares within those industries. We write the standard within-between accounting decomposition for each country i across 10 industries k:
where ! i, k denotes industry k's share in country i's value added, x denotes the arithmetic mean of the variable x, and Áx denotes the estimated linear trend in x.
Figure VI plots labor share trends, the left-hand side of equation (2), on the horizontal axis against the within-industry component, the first term on the right-hand side of equation (2) WA  DE  VT  HI  RH  NV  KS  CT  SC  ME  PA  CA  IN  VA  DC  TN  NH  OR  OH  WY  NC  AZ  WV  NJ  LA  FL  GA  ID  MI  AL  OK  TX  MO  IL  MD  MA  NM  NY  MS  AR  CO  MN  WI  UT  NE  IA  SD  KY MT ND
FIGURE IV
Estimated Trends in U.S. State Labor Shares
The figure shows estimated trends in the labor share for 51 U.S. states plus the District of Columbia in BEA data starting in 1975. Trend coefficients are reported in units per 10 years (i.e., a value of À5 means a 5 percentage point decline every 10 years).
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are aligned along the 45-degree line, implying that labor share declines are predominantly driven by the within-industry component. Furthermore, critical for our cross-sectional analyses that follow, cross-country variation in labor share trends is largely explained by cross-country variation in the within-industry component. When we add the within-industry component across all countries and divide by the sum of the total components, we conclude that more than 90% of the labor share decline reflects within-industry declines. 12 The prominence of the within-industry component is also interesting because it rules out otherwise plausible stories related to the increasing trade integration of China or 12. This statistic will vary with the fineness of the industry definition. If we calculate this statistic using an alternative decomposition available in KLEMS containing 23 (rather than 10) industries, we attribute roughly 85% of the decline to the within-industry component.
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globalization more generally. For example, imagine a simple twocountry Heckscher-Ohlin model with Cobb-Douglas production in two sectors with different labor shares. Compared to autarky, the relatively capital-abundant economy will in the free trade equilibrium allocate a larger share of its inputs to the production of the lower labor share industry. If we think of China as the relatively labor-abundant economy opening up to trade, one might predict a decline in the rest of the world's labor share due to this mechanism. In addition to the fact that we document a labor share decline in China itself (as well as other labor-abundant countries like India and Mexico), this trade-induced compositional change is unlikely to explain the labor share decline in other countries because it counterfactually implies an important role for the between component in equation (2) 13. We calculated each country's trends in imports, exports, and overall trade both bilaterally with China and multilaterally, where the change in flows are expressed relative the country's GDP. These measures of increasing exposure to China and to the rest of the world do not generally correlate with declines in the labor share.
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II.B. Declining Prices of Investment Goods
In parallel with these large and broad trends in the labor share, the price of investment relative to consumption goods has also experienced a pervasive decline. For our cross-country analyses, we measure the relative price of investment goods in two datasets which offer different costs and benefits. Our first source is the Penn World Tables (PWT, Mark 7.1), which offers measures at a point in time of the relative price levels of investment and consumption goods for many countries around the world. The PWT data are translated using investment-specific and consumption-specific purchasing power parity exchange rates, which is undesirable for our exercise because we wish to know the price of investment relative to consumption that a domestic producer faces. We therefore follow Restuccia and Urrutia (2001) and divide the PWT relative price of investment of each country by the PWT relative price of investment in the United States. We then multiply this ratio by the ratio of the investment price deflator to the personal consumption expenditure deflator for the United States, obtained from the BEA. This procedure yields for each country the relative price of investment measured at domestic prices.
The PWT data cover a large set of countries and in some cases extend back to 1950. Furthermore, by combining the PWT's information on the cross-section of international prices with timeseries information on the relative price of investment from the United States, the constructed series are insensitive to crosscountry differences in methodologies used to construct investment price deflators. If the U.S. BEA employs hedonic adjustments to properly capture changes in the quality of computers, for example, then our methodology will imply that this same adjustment is implicitly captured for all countries in the data.
The solid line in Figure VII plots year fixed effects from a regression of the log relative price of investment in the PWT data set after absorbing country dummies. The regressions are weighted by GDP, and the fixed effects are normalized to equal 0 in 1980. The series exhibits a mild decline from 1950 to 1980, trending downward about 0.02 log point per decade. Consistent with Fisher (2006) , however, the series exhibits a clear break around 1980 and declines at a rate closer to 0.1 log point per decade after 1980. This steep downward trend occurred all around the world. Of the countries with at least 15 years of data on both the PWT relative price of investment and on labor shares, 44 experienced declines in the relative price of investment since 1975, compared to only 14 that experienced an increase.
As a second measure of the relative price of investment goods, we take the ratio in each country of the fixed investment deflator to the consumption price index, obtained by comparing nominal and real measures of gross fixed investment and household consumption from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI). These data rely more on the individual statistical agencies in each country but offer the benefit of properly capturing differences in the composition of investment spending across countries. 14 The short-dashed line in Figure VII 14. We enrich the WDI data with equivalent data from the Economist Intelligence Unit for a small number of countries that are not included in WDI.
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The global trends in the PWT and WDI data are highly similar. Very moderate declines in the relative price of investment prior to 1980 are followed by steep subsequent declines. The decline in the WDI data is also widespread across countries, with 43 experiencing declines compared to 11 with increases. There are differences in country and time coverage between the PWT and WDI sources, but when we consider overlapping country-year observations, we measure a cross-country correlation of about .75 between the trends found in the two data sets.
Finally, our industry-level analyses use KLEMS data on investment and output prices in each industry. Though the key variation we use from this data set will be cross-industry differences in declines in the relative price of investment, we demonstrate comparability with the other sources by plotting time fixed effects from regressions using the country-level relative price of investment in KLEMS. The long-dashed line in Figure VII shows an increasing trend that sharply reverses in the early 1980s, consistent with the timing of the decline captured in the other data sources. All countries in KLEMS with sufficient data for this analysis exhibit a declining relative price of investment. Excluding the United Kingdom, which is an outlier in KLEMS, the correlations of these trends with the trends found in PWT and WDI across countries are .60 and .75, respectively.
III. A Model of the Labor Share
We now develop a model that relates the labor share to the relative price of investment goods as well as to other macroeconomic variables, such as price markups and factor-augmenting technology. We consider a two-sector economic environment in which final consumption and investment goods are produced by combining intermediate inputs using a CES technology. Time is discrete and the horizon is infinite, t = 0,1,2, . . . There is no uncertainty and all economic agents have perfect foresight. All payments in this economy are made in terms of the final consumption good, which is the numeraire.
III.A. Final Consumption Good
Competitive producers assemble the final consumption good C t from a continuum of intermediate inputs z 2 ½0, 1 and sell it to the household at a price P c t . They produce final consumption with the technology:
where c t ðzÞ denotes the quantity of input z used in production of the final consumption good and t > 1 denotes the elasticity of substitution between input varieties. The consumption good producers purchase these inputs at prices p t ðzÞ from monopolistically competitive firms that charge a markup over marginal cost t that depends on t . To capture changes in markups over time, we allow the elasticity of substitution across varieties to vary over time.
Cost minimization implies that the demand for input variety z for use in producing the consumption good is c t ðzÞ ¼ p t ðzÞ
The final consumption good is the numeraire and has a price of 1. It is competitively produced, so its price equals the marginal cost of production:
III.B. Final Investment Good
Competitive producers assemble the final investment good X t from the same continuum of intermediate inputs z:
The exogenous variable t denotes the technology level in the production of the consumption good relative to the investment good. A decline of t implies an improvement in the technology of producing the investment good relative to the consumption good.
Since firms in the final investment good sector are competitive, the price of the final investment good equals the marginal cost of production,
as the relative price of investment, which declines whenever technology in the investment good sector improves relative to the consumption good sector. Finally, demand for input variety z for use in production of the investment good is given by x t ðzÞ ¼ t p t ðzÞ À t X t .
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III.C. Producers of Intermediate Inputs
The producer of intermediate input variety z operates a constant returns to scale technology in capital and labor inputs to produce output sold to both consumption and investment good producers, y t ðzÞ ¼ Fðk t ðzÞ, n t ðzÞÞ. Capital is rented at rate R t and labor is rented at a price W t from the household. Producers of intermediate inputs take input prices and aggregate demand, Y t ¼ C t þ t X t , as given.
The profit-maximization problem of the producer of intermediate input z is: max p t ðzÞ, y t ðzÞ, k t ðzÞ, n t ðzÞ Å t ðzÞ ¼ p t ðzÞy t ðzÞ À R t k t ðzÞ À W t n t ðzÞ, ð6Þ subject to
The first-order condition with respect to capital is p t ðzÞF k, t ðzÞ ¼ t R t and with respect to labor is p t ðzÞF n, t ðzÞ ¼ t W t . Firms set the marginal revenue product of factors as a markup t ¼ t t À1 over factor prices.
III.D. Household
The household derives utility from consumption goods and disutility from supplying labor. It purchases consumption and investment goods from final good producers at prices 1 and t , respectively. The household uses the investment good to augment the physical capital stock and rents capital to producers of intermediate goods at a rental rate R t . The household owns all firms in the economy and receives their profits as dividends in every period. The household supplies labor to intermediate input producers at a wage W t . It can also hold some asset B t that pays a real interest rate r t and is in zero net supply. Denoting by t a household preference shifter and by b the discount factor, the problem of the household in some period t 0 is:
subject to initial capital K 0 and assets B 0 , the capital accumulation equation, K tþ1 ¼ ð1ÀÞK t þX t , and the household budget constraint:
GLOBAL DECLINE OF THE LABOR SHARE Aggregate labor supplied by the household is N t ¼ R 1 0 n t ðzÞdz and the aggregate capital stock is K t ¼ R 1 0 k t ðzÞdz. Household optimization implies a standard Euler equation for consumption across time and a standard intraperiod condition for leisure and consumption. Finally, the first-order condition with respect to capital is given by:
tþ1 , N tþ1 Þ denotes the gross real interest rate. This condition says that the household invests in physical capital up to the point where the marginal benefit of investing in capital (the rental rate) equals the marginal cost of investing in capital.
III.E. Equilibrium
We define an equilibrium for this economy as a sequence of prices and quantities such that, given a sequence of exogenous variables: (i) the household maximizes its utility; (ii) final producers of the consumption good minimize their costs; (iii) final producers of the investment good minimize their costs; (iv) each producer of input variety z maximizes profits; and (v) markets for labor, capital, assets, consumption, investment, and intermediate inputs clear in every date. We define a steady state as an equilibrium in which all variables are constant over time.
The equilibrium of the model is symmetric, with p t ðzÞ ¼ P
where N t and K t are total labor and total capital. The share of income paid as wages for labor services, rentals for capital, and profits are given by:
where s L, t þ s K, t þ s Å, t ¼ 1:
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III.F. The Production Function
We assume intermediate inputs are produced with a CES production function:
where s denotes the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor in production and k is a distribution parameter. We let A K,t and A N,t denote capital-augmenting and labor-augmenting technology, respectively. The limit of the CES production function as s approaches 1 is the Cobb-Douglas production function,
With the production function (14), the firm's first-order conditions with respect to capital and labor are:
III.G. The Labor Share
We can now discuss the determinants of the labor share of income s L,t . Using the first-order condition for capital in equation (15) and the definitions of the income shares in equations (11)-(13), we derive an expression that relates the labor share to markups, capital-augmenting technology, and the rental rate of capital for some value of the elasticity of substitution s and the distribution parameter k :
In the limiting case of a Cobb-Douglas production function where ¼ 1, the labor share of income simply becomes s L, t ¼ 1À k t . Therefore, with Cobb-Douglas production the labor share of income varies over time only when markups vary over time and the labor share of cost, s L, t t ¼ W t N t W t N t þR t K t , is constant. As we discuss later, our estimation strategy focuses on labor share trends because this allows us to control for substantial cross-country heterogeneity in both economic parameters (e.g., initial level of technology) and measurement practices. We write equation (17) in changes between two arbitrary periods t and t 0 > t as:
whereẐ ¼ Z t 0 Z t À 1 denotes the percent change of some variable Z between periods t and t 0 and where for notational convenience we drop subscripts from values corresponding to the initial period t.
For any value of the elasticity of substitution s, given initial conditions for the labor share s L and markups m, equation (18) implies that information on changes in markups, in capitalaugmenting technologyÂ K , and in the rental rate of capitalR is sufficient to pin down changes in the labor shareŝ L . Additional knowledge of wage and labor-augmenting technology is not informative for understanding changes in the labor share.
One can estimate the elasticity of substitution s either using the first-order condition with respect to capital, equation (15), or using the first-order condition with respect to labor, equation (16) . The former requires data on growth in the rental rate, whereas the latter requires data on growth in wages. Our estimate of s uses long-run trends spanning 15 to 37 years of data and treats these trends as steady-state-to-steady-state transitions. As can be seen in equation (10), if we assume constant discount factors b and constant depreciation rates d over time (but not necessarily across countries), we can equate trends in the rental rate to trends in the relative price of investment,R ¼. We prefer estimating s using equation (18) which comes from the first-order condition with respect to capital relative to estimating s using the first-order condition with respect to labor because internationally comparable and high-quality data on growth in x are more readily available than data on wage growth.
To summarize, holding fixed the discount factor and the depreciation rate of capital, the labor share will only change in the steady state of our model if A K , m, or x change. This general result argues against the relevance for the long-run decline in labor share of a large set of factors, such as wage markups, labor income taxes and other labor supply shocks, and government spending shocks that do not directly affect the production function. 15
IV. The Elasticity of Substitution
In this section we confront equation (18) with our data to estimate the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor s. We start by focusing only on trends in the relative price of investment and abstract from markups and capital-augmenting technological progress because we lack direct measurements on them. Next, we introduce assumptions that allow us to impute time-varying markups from data on investment spending, and we quantify the sensitivity of our estimates to capitalaugmenting technological progress. Finally, we estimate s with production functions that allow for differential substitutability between capital and two types of labor. Equipped with our estimates of s, in Section V we quantify the effect of the decline in the relative price of investment goods on the labor share and explore the broader macroeconomic and welfare implications of our findings.
We measure the percent change of all variables (corresponding to our ''hat'' notation) as the linear trend in the log of the variable using all available data. We replace the variables in levels with their average values in our sample. As discussed, we focus on long-run trends and will think of them as capturing movements from an initial to a final steady state. Assuming a constant household discount factor b and depreciation rate d, this allows us to substitute the percent change across steady states in the rental rate of capital with the percent change in the relative price of investment goods,R ¼. However, we also show that our results are robust when we allow for trends in depreciation rates. 15 . For this reason our model abstracts from wage markups, labor income taxes, and household shocks to the utility of leisure relative to consumption. All these factors are isomorphic to a change in in household preferences in the sense that none can affect the labor share of income, the capital-labor ratio, and the wage in the steady state of the model. Steady-state wages do not depend on because with constant returns to scale the change in capital implies a shift in labor demand that exactly offsets any shifts in labor supply.
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IV.A. Relative Price of Investment
We start with equation (18) and set ¼ 1, ¼ 0, and A K ¼ 0. We take a linear approximation around ¼ 0 and add a constant and an idiosyncratic error term to obtain our estimating equation:
where j denotes observations. The intuition behind equation (19) is simple. Absent economic profits and capital-augmenting technology growth, a positive relationship between trends in the relative price of investment j and trends in the labor shareŝ L, j is possible only when the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor s exceeds 1. In that case, a decrease of the cost of capital due to decreases in the relative price of investment induces firms to substitute away from labor and toward capital to such an extent that it drives down the labor share. If trends in the relative price of investment were unrelated to trends in the labor share, this would imply a Cobb-Douglas production function with s = 1. A negative relationship between trends in the relative price of investment and trends in the labor share would imply s < 1.
We emphasize that the identification of s in equation (19) comes from the cross-sectional variation of trends in labor shares and trends in the price of investment. Specifically, adding a constant g to the regression allows us to control for global factors that affect all countries. For example, imagine that all countries experienced declining trends in labor shares and the price of investment goods, but the extent of the labor share decline across countries was unrelated to the extent of the decline in the price of investment across countries. In such a case, we would estimate s = 1. Put differently, even though both the labor share and the relative price of investment declined over time for the typical country in our sample, our estimation using cross-sectional variation could hypothetically produce an elasticity estimate less than 1. In this sense, our methodology for estimating the elasticity does not incorporate information from the global trend that we hope to explain.
Given the small number of observations, estimation of equation (19) is particularly sensitive to outliers. We standardize our selection and treatment of outliers by generating ''robust regression'' estimates, which place less weight on extreme values that are identified endogenously during the estimation. 16 In practice, the primary difference compared with ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates for most of our results is that the robust regressions endogenously assign very little weight to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Niger. Table I presents our baseline estimates of s from equation (19). In the first four rows we estimate s using our country data set, with j indexing the country observations. The first two rows under the column labeled ''Labor Share'' list the source as ''KN Merged'' to refer to our full data set described above and rows (iii)-(iv) list the source as ''OECD and UN'' to refer to a similarly constructed data set that only uses data easily downloadable online from the UN and OECD (i.e., it discards the data we collected ourselves from country-specific Internet sources and physical books). The column labeled ''Investment Price'' alternates in these rows between PWT and WDI to indicate the data source used for. These first four specifications produce highly similar results, with the estimated s always significantly greater than 1.
To visualize these results, we plot in Figure VIII the crosscountry relationship between the left-hand side of equation (19) and the trends in the price of investment goods. 17 We use the KN Merged data set for the labor share, the PWT for the price of investment goods, and drop the three outliers discussed before to ensure that the plotted least-squares line closely corresponds to the estimate presented in the first row of Table I . Countries with larger relative price of investment declines also 16 . This regression is implemented with the command rreg in the statistical package STATA. The idea behind a robust regression is to weight less those observations that lie further from the regression line. The method starts by dropping observations with Cook's distance greater than 1. Then an iterative process calculates weights based on absolute residuals. The process stops when the maximum change between the weights from one iteration to the next is below some tolerance level. All regressions reported in this article use this procedure.
17. In our closed economy model, the variation in the relative price of investment across countries is tied to different sectoral productivity shocks in each country. This intuition can be extended to the open economy if one thinks of investment goods as freely tradeable across countries and consumption goods as being at least partly nontradeable. As in Balassa-Samuelson, prices of investment goods would be equalized across countries but differential technology growth in traded relative to nontraded sectors will shift the price of investment relative to consumption in each country. Aside from productivity shocks, cross-country differences in the relative price of investment may also come from differences in the scale and timing of reductions in tariffs and other trade frictions. (19). All values are scaled to denote changes per 10 years. For example, a value of À10 for the trend in the log relative price of investment means a roughly 10% decline of the price every 10 years. The figure excludes three countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Niger) with extremely low weights in the baseline regression of the first row of Table I . The best-fit line shown in the figure has a slope of 0.28.
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experienced larger labor share declines, which results in a statistically significant positive slope of 0.28 and an implied elasticity of 1. 28. 18 As shown in Figure I , the global labor share decline is similar when measured within the corporate sector or when measured in the overall economy. At the country level, the correlation between these two trends is roughly 60%. We find, however, that estimates of s using equation (19) differ when using overall rather than corporate labor shares. In the specification corresponding to the first row of Table I , if we restrict the sample only to countries that have data on the corporate labor share (dropping the countries where we use a scaled version of the overall labor share), we obtain the larger elasticity estimate of 1.32, which is statistically greater than 1 at the 1% level. If instead we use overall rather than corporate labor shares, the relationship between labor share and investment price trends loses its significance and therefore cannot be used to rule out a unitary elasticity. In this sense, we argue that the better measured and internationally comparable corporate labor share data are important if one wishes to use cross-country variation to understand the behavior of the labor share.
In addition to using cross-country variation within the corporate sector, we use the KLEMS data set to similarly analyze cross-country variation within particular industries. Unfortunately, we cannot isolate the corporate labor share in the KLEMS data, and therefore these analyses in principle may be affected by cross-country differences in the scale, measurement, and behavior of unincorporated business and government production. In practice, however, we worry less about these problems for this analysis for three reasons. First, because we use KLEMS to study within-industry variation, our results are not affected by compositional differences across countries. If an industry with many sole proprietors is particularly large in one country, for example, this will not be problematic because our observations 18. We use a linear approximation of equation (18) to derive our estimating equation (19) because it makes more transparent how changes in the labor share are related to changes in the relative price of investment and highlights the variation that identifies our elasticity estimate. If instead we directly use the nonlinear equation (17) and estimate d 1 À s L, j ¼ þ 1 À ð Þ j þ u j , we obtain highly similar results for s that differ from those in rows (i) to (iv) of Table I by -0.035 to 0.008. We used numerical simulations to confirm that the approximation errors in Section IV.B are also small.
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are at the industry level. Second, the KLEMS data we use are only available for 14 developed economies, where measurement practices are more similar than in the larger group of countries already analyzed. Third, we verify that our results hold for two measures of the labor share in KLEMS, one that makes no adjustment for unincorporated businesses (KLEMS 1) and another that makes an adjustment (KLEMS 2). 19 The last two rows of Table I report estimates of s using the KLEMS data set, with j indexing country-industry observations for 10 major industries and 14 developed economies. We include both country and industry fixed effects in the regression. As shown in rows (v) and (vi), both elasticity estimates from these data are also significantly greater than 1.
Our estimates allow for substantial heterogeneity across countries and industries. Initial differences in technology, wages, relative prices of investment, preferences, and depreciation rates are all captured by the initial level of the labor share s L,j , which is allowed to vary across observations in the left-hand side of equation (19). If our trends capture a steadystate-to-steady-state transition, and assuming constant discount factor and depreciation rates over time (but not necessarily across countries), our estimates of s allow for differences in the growth of wages, labor-augmenting technology, and anything other than capital-augmenting technology and markups, which we address shortly. The only substantial restriction we are imposing is a common elasticity of substitution s between capital and labor across countries or industries. 20 19. In KLEMS 1, the labor share at the country-industry level is defined as compensation of employees divided by gross value added, consistent with our measurement of overall labor shares above. In KLEMS 2, the numerator additionally includes a fraction of other taxes on production and an imputation for the income of self-employed workers. The results reported in Section II.A use the KLEMS 1 definition of the labor share. They are qualitatively similar if we use KLEMS 2.
20. This restriction is tied to our strategy of using cross-sectional variation to identify s. We prefer using cross-sectional variation as it eliminates the influence of global trends, but to check the robustness of our results, we have also estimated country or country-industry specific s's based on long-term time-series variation. We generate an estimate j for each observation by dividing the left-hand side of equation (19) by the right-hand side of equation (19) after dropping the constant and the error term,
Þj . The median elasticity estimate across countries in the data set with the KN Merged labor share and the PWT prices equals 1.41.
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Up to now our analysis imposes constant depreciation rates over time. We note that if industries or countries that experienced larger declines in their relative price of investment are systematically shifting the composition of their capital stock toward capital goods with higher depreciation rates (e.g., computers), then our estimated s is generally biased downward. This is because a given labor share decline would be associated with smaller declines in the rental rate of capital, therefore increasing the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor necessary to generate the positive relationship between labor share trends and trends in the rental rate. 21 We empirically assess the extent of this bias in the KLEMS data set because it includes estimates of depreciation and capital stocks at the country-industry level. We write the steady-state expression for the rental rate and add a subscript to the depreciation rate, R j ¼ j ð 1 À 1 þ j Þ, which means we can no longer equate growth in the rental rate with growth in the relative price of investment. We assume b = 0.91, measure j and j in the KLEMS data, and calculate alternative values forR j . Our estimated elasticity does not change meaningfully. The values in rows (v) and (vi) of Table I, 1.17 and 1.49, increase to 1.19 and 1.51, respectively, when taking into account heterogeneous and time-varying depreciation rates.
To summarize, our six baseline estimates of s in Table I average 1.28, a bit more than our baseline value of 1.25 in row (i), and are all statistically greater than 1 at the 5% significance level. Section V analyzes in greater detail the implications of our estimates. Here we note that using s = 1.25 together with calibrated global values for s L and as inputs in equation (19) implies that roughly half of the global decline in the labor share is explained by the decline in the relative price of investment.
IV.B. Markups
We now allow for the possibility that our estimated elasticity is affected by markups m j . As a simple example of how markups could bias our estimates from Section IV.A, consider the Cobb-Douglas case, which has an elasticity of substitution between capital and labor equal to 1. Though the labor share of costs is constant, markups generate a wedge between costs and revenues and can cause movements in the labor share of income. If markups increased more in countries with larger declines in the relative price of investment, then labor shares would decline more in these countries. Without taking into account markup variation, our baseline procedure would incorrectly estimate an elasticity greater than 1.
We use estimates of capital share trends in our data to rule out this possibility. Under the assumption the trends reflect movements from one steady state to another, the trend in each country's capital share equals the trend in its nominal investment rate,ŝ K, j ¼ d
If the true elasticity is 1 and markup growth drives all labor share movements, then labor and capital shares of income change by the same percent. Figure IX plots the percent change in labor shares against the percent change in capital shares. Countries do not lie along the 45-degree line. Rather, the best-fit line has essentially zero slope. This finding provides strong evidence against the possibility that we estimate a nonunitary elasticity purely due to the bias from markups. To more generally assess the effect of markups on our elasticity estimate, we calculate the markup levels m j and trends j and derive a modified estimating equation that includes these terms. Since factor and profit shares sum to 1 and the markup can be backed out directly from the profit share, the markup is given by j ¼ 1 1Às Å, j ¼ 1 s L, j þs K, j . Given our data on s L,j , the only additional information we need to calculate markups is the level of the capital share, s K,j .
To calculate the capital share, we substitute the steady state level of the rental rate R j ¼ j 1 j À 1 þ j and the steady-state level of the capital K j ¼ X j j into equation (12) and write it as:
We calculate the first term of the right-hand side of equation (20) for each country as the average nominal investment rate in our data from the national income accounts. We assume the second term is homogeneous across countries and choose d j = 0.10 and b j QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS as before. This gives us the level of the markup. We then calculate the trend in the markup as: 22
We continue to assume no capital-augmenting technological progress and setÂ K ¼ 0 in equation (18). Taking a linear approximation around ¼ 0 and ¼ 0, adding a constant and an idiosyncratic error term, we obtain our modified estimating equation:
Table II reports our estimates of s from equation (22). As before, we report values across multiple data sources on the labor share and the relative price of investment, but here we also report whether we use total or corporate nominal investment data in constructing markups. We consider these estimates less reliable than our baseline estimates because they require richer assumptions and make use of imputed values as opposed to direct measurements. Nonetheless, the results in Table II are highly similar to the baseline results in Table I. The similarity in our estimated s when including or excluding information on markups does not imply that markups played no role in labor share movements. In fact, since we do not generally find significant increases in capital shares, it must be the case that some of labor share's decline is attributable to markup growth. Given that our elasticity estimates remain unchanged, however, we maintain our conclusion that the decline in the relative price of investment explains roughly half of the labor share decline.
22. Similar methodologies for calculating markups and profits are employed in Rotemberg and Woodford (1995) , Basu and Fernald (2002) , and Fernald and Neiman (2011) . The average initial profit share varies across data sources but generally is less than 5%, consistent with most estimates in these papers. For some countries this methodology implies negative profit shares. We have considered various ad hoc treatments for such observations that bound profit shares above 0 and have explored alternative values for b and d. Results vary depending on the methodology, but for small average profit shares, average estimates of s are consistently close to our baseline estimates. We only do this analysis at the country level because when applied to the more disaggregated industry data, our procedure often imputes implausibly large capital shares.
IV.C. Capital-Augmenting Technological Progress
Given the difficulty of properly measuring capital-augmenting technology growth, our baseline analysis assumed that it is orthogonal to changes in the relative price of investment. This assumption would be violated, for example, if firms respond to the decline in the relative price of investment by directing their investments toward capital-augmenting technological improvements. If this or other mechanisms produced a negative correlation between growth in the relative price of investment and growth in capital-augmenting technology, our elasticity estimates would be biased upward. In this section, we demonstrate that this bias is unlikely to be quantitatively large. The figure plots the trend in the log capital share against the trend in the log labor share. All values are scaled to denote percent changes per 10 years. For example, a value of À10 for the trend in the log labor share means a 10% decline of the labor share every 10 years. For illustrative reasons, in this figure we drop three observations (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Macau) with extremely low weights in the regression of the first row of Table II and we winsorize one observation in each dimension for both variables. The solid line represents the fitted relationship between trends in capital share and trends in the labor share (slope 0.20 with a standard error of 0.23), whereas the dashed line represents the 45-degree line.
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Consider the baseline estimating equation for the labor share, modified to allow for capital-augmenting technology growth:
Let denote our estimate of the elasticity of substitution when omitting capital-augmenting technology growth from the regression and let s denote the true elasticity of substitution. Then the bias is given by:
where corrÂ K , denotes the correlation between capital-augmenting technology growth and changes in the relative price of investment, and sdÂ K and sd denote their respective standard deviations in the cross-section of countries. The bias tends to 0 as the true elasticity s approaches 1.
Consider the possibility that countries that experienced the greatest declines in their relative price of investment also experienced the highest capital-augmenting technology growth, corrÂ K , < 0. Equation (24) shows that if the true elasticity of substitution is greater than 1, then our estimate is upward biased ( > ). If the true elasticity is lower than 1, then our estimate is downward biased. This logic implies that as long as corrÂ K , < 0, the bias from capital-augmenting technology growth would never cause us to mistakenly estimate an elasticity of substitution s that exceeds 1 if the true elasticity was smaller than 1.
To quantify the size of the bias using equation (24), we need to specify values for the standard deviations of the relative price of investment and capital-augmenting technology growth and for the correlation between these two variables. To get a sense for these moments, we combine our PWT and WDI data on with cross-country estimates of TFP growth that we use as proxies for capital-augmenting technology growthÂ K . 23 Although imperfect, this is a reasonable exercise becauseÂ K is the product of capitalaugmenting and Hicks-neutral technology growth. We estimate corrðÂ K ,Þ ¼ À0:28, sdðÂ K Þ ¼ 0:10, and sdðÞ ¼ 0:11. Given these values, and given an estimate ¼ 1:25, equation (24) implies a true elasticity of s = 1.20.
Alternatively, we use the model to calculate the capital-augmenting technology growth assuming that it accounts for all labor share changes not attributable to changes in the relative price of investment. Using the estimated values of the constant and residual termsũ j in equation (19), the growth in capitalaugmenting technological progress isÂ K ¼ þũ j 1À . We find that the resulting cross-country pattern ofÂ K is essentially uncorrelated with, which implies that the bias is close to 0. 24 We conclude that any upward bias from capital-augmenting technology growth is small and unlikely to alter our conclusions. With alternative estimates of the covariance betweenÂ K and, one can use equation (24) to obtain different magnitudes of the bias. For the results to differ significantly from ours, however, the cross-country pattern of capital-augmenting technology growth would need to be significantly different than the patterns in 23. We use TFP estimates from the Conference Board's Total Economy Database, which are available from 1990 to 2012 for about 50 countries overlapping with our data set. The estimated moments account for the existence of outliers and represent averages between the PWT and the WDI data sets.
24. The implied values for the growth in capital-augmenting technology vary significantly across countries. The average growth in A K is 0.9% per year. The majority of countries, including six out of the eight largest economies, exhibit positive growth.
both the external estimates of TFP growth and our internal estimates of capital-augmenting technology growth.
IV.D. Skilled versus Unskilled Labor
Our analyses thus far assume that all labor types are equally substitutable with capital. Influential work such as Krusell et al. (2000) , however, has suggested the importance of the differential substitutability of capital with different types of skill. Additionally, there have been significant trends in recent decades in the skill composition of the labor force related to changing skill premia, specialization, and international trade. We use KLEMS data to evaluate whether changes in the skill composition of the labor force in a production function with differential capital-skill substitutability alter our conclusion that the decline in the relative price of investment goods accounts for half of the decline in the global labor share.
We maintain the assumption of a homogeneous capital stock K t but now distinguish between two types of labor, skilled S t and unskilled U t . Within the CES framework, there are three ways in which skilled labor, unskilled labor, and the capital stock can be nested. The first way is as in the production function (14), in which the aggregate labor input is a function of different skills, N t = N t (S t ,U t ), and N t and the capital stock K t combine with a constant elasticity of substitution s. In this case all our previous results continue to apply.
The second way to nest the three inputs is through the production function:
where r is the elasticity of substitution between capital and skilled labor and s is the elasticity of those factors with unskilled labor. We follow the same steps as in the two-factor case to derive the corresponding estimating equation:
where we continue to define the labor share as the sum of all compensation to all labor types. The term d S j K j denotes the change in the ratio of skilled labor to capital. The third way to nest the three inputs is to reverse the structure in (25), with capital and unskilled labor combining with each other with an elasticity of substitution r and the combined input aggregating with skilled labor with an elasticity s. This alternative production function leads to an identical estimating equation as equation (26), but with S j replaced by U j . We estimate s for both of these nesting structures using the KLEMS industry data, where the change in either skilled or unskilled labor relative to capital is added as a covariate. We consider two definitions of unskilled labor, one that includes KLEMS's definitions of both ''middle'' and ''low'' skill and the other just using ''low.'' As with the previous industry-level estimates, we use both KLEMS definitions of the labor share and include industry and country fixed effects. Table III presents our estimates. Across the six specifications, the estimates for s average 1.26, very close to the average of our baseline estimates in Table I . In all cases, the estimated s is significantly different from 1 at the 10% level.
As with the case of markups, the similarity in our estimated s when including or excluding the possibility of capital-skill complementarity does not imply that changes in the stock of skill played no role in labor share movements. 25 Rather, the results in Table III simply confirm that even with these alternative production functions and taking into account the changing skill composition of labor, the decline in the relative price of investment continues to account on its own for about half of the labor share decline. Figure VII documented a global decline in the relative price of investment goods of about 25%. Using cross-country variation, we estimated an elasticity of substitution between capital and labor of about 1.25. This estimate proves stable when 25. Depending on the specification, the coefficients on c S K À Á or c U K À Á suggest that skill composition may in fact have played some role in the declining labor share. The coefficient on these covariates is a function of the two elasticities s and r, the level of S K or U K , and the distribution parameter 2 . So this regression alone cannot be used to identify the value of r.
V. The Decline in the Labor Share
we take into account markup variation, capital-augmenting technology growth, and changes in the skill composition of the labor force. Using this elasticity estimate and setting the global labor share to the average level in our sample, we find that the 25% negative shock to the relative price of investment generates roughly half of the decline in the global labor share.
Our estimates of the elasticity s, markup growth, and the shock in the relative price of investment have additional implications for other macroeconomic aggregates and for welfare. In this section, we solve for the general equilibrium of our model to consider the broader importance of our findings. We highlight that the implications of our explanation of the decline in labor share can differ starkly from those of alternative explanations.
To assess the effect of our estimated elasticity, we calibrate two economies, one with CES production and s = 1.25 and the other an otherwise identical economy but with Cobb-Douglas production (i.e., s = 1). 26 The first two columns of Table IV report the results when we introduce into the Cobb-Douglas and CES 26. Period utility is given by V t ¼ logðC t Þ À 1 2 N 2 t . We normalize the relative price of investment goods in the initial steady state to x = 1 and set the depreciation rate at 10% to target a steady state investment rate of 20%. We set the discount factor as before to b = 0.91. Finally, we choose a k in the production function (14) to target a 60% steady-state labor share. By appropriately normalizing the levels of Hicksneutral technology separately for the CES production function and for the Cobb-Douglas production function, the two economies share exactly the same initial steady state in all other variables. economies a 25% negative shock to the relative price of investment. All changes in the table are across steady states. 27 The first three rows show the percentage point change in factor shares. As expected, the shock has no effect on the labor share in the Cobb-Douglas economy, whereas it generates a 2.6 percentage point decline in the CES economy. Given that markups do not change, the decline in the CES case is associated with an equal percentage point increase in the capital share. In addition to the implications for labor share, a comparison of these first two columns reveals important differences for output and welfare in the economies' responses to the shock. Given the greater substitutability between capital and labor, the CES economy adjusts more to the lower cost of capital, resulting in a larger increase in the capital-labor ratio than in the Cobb-Douglas economy. This implies that in response to the same decline in the price of investment, the CES economy experiences higher GDP, consumption, and investment growth. Welfare, in terms of equivalent consumption units, increases by 22%, or 4 percentage points, more in the CES economy relative to the Cobb-Douglas economy.
The third and fourth columns evaluate the response of the two economies to a markup shock that increases the profit share 27. Here we explore the long-run implications of changes in the labor share. Rios-Rull and Santaeulalia-Llopis (2010) discuss the implications of variable labor shares for business cycle fluctuations.
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from an initial level of 3% to a final level of 8% while holding x constant. Broadly in line with our results from Section IV.B, we choose the scale of this markup shock to generate an identical decline in the labor share as generated by the shock in the CES case. In the Cobb-Douglas case, consistent with the logic presented earlier, the labor and capital shares decline by an equal percent (the values in rows (i) and (ii) are not equal as they are in percentage points). Comparing the second and fourth columns, we conclude that alternative explanations for an equal decline in the labor share entail different macroeconomic implications. If labor share declines result from declines in the relative price of investment with CES production, they are associated with significant output and welfare gains. In contrast, labor share declines associated with markup increases in fact reduce welfare.
The fifth and sixth columns consider the simultaneous introduction of a decline in the relative price of investment and an increase in markups. In the CES case, these shocks together can produce the entire 5 percentage point decline in the labor share. The changes in output and welfare in the case with both shocks are quantitatively closer to the outcomes with only the shock than to those with only the shock. Markups may be of roughly equal importance as the relative price of investment for explaining the total global labor share decline, but this evidence suggests that the component attributable to the markup shock had far less important macroeconomic implications than the component attributable to the decline in the relative price of investment.
VI. Conclusion
In this article we do three things. We document a decline in the global labor share over the past 35 years, offer an explanation for the decline, and assess the resulting macroeconomic implications. We start by showing that the share of income accruing to labor has declined in the large majority of countries and industries. Larger labor share declines occurred in countries or industries with larger declines in their relative price of investment goods. Next, we use this cross-sectional variation to estimate the shape of the production function and conclude that the decline in the relative price of investment explains roughly half of the decline in the global labor share. Finally, we explore the macroeconomic and welfare implications of our results. We emphasize that our explanation for the labor share decline carries with it significantly different implications from alternative explanations.
Our conclusions suggest several paths for future research. For example, the secular decline of the labor share suggests that nonunitary elasticities of substitution in production may be an important element to incorporate in business cycle models. Our results also imply meaningful changes in the distribution of income when households have heterogeneous assets or when skills are differentially substitutable with capital and can accumulate endogenously. Furthermore, as labor shares have declined, business earnings and corporate saving have increased. This large change in the flow of funds between households and firms may have important macroeconomic repercussions. 28 Last, our results support the view that changes in technology, likely associated with the computer and information technology age, are key factors in understanding long-term changes in factor shares. This raises natural questions. What will be the future path of the relative price of investment? Will the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor change over time? Standard macroeconomic models do not allow for long-term trends in labor shares, a strong prediction that we show to be violated in the data since the early 1980s. We hope our results generate new frameworks and analyses useful for thinking about these future trends.
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